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Surprise is a ubiquitous concept describing a wide range of phenomena from
unexpected events to behavioral responses. We propose a measure of surprise,
to arrive at a new framework for surprise-driven learning. There are two
components to this framework: (i) a confidence-adjusted surprise measure to
capture environmental statistics as well as subjective beliefs, (ii) a surprise-
minimization learning rule, or SMiLe-rule, which dynamically adjusts the
balance between new and old information without making prior assumptions
about the temporal statistics in the environment. We apply our framework
to a dynamic decision making task and a maze exploration task to demon-
strate that it is suitable for learning in complex environments, even if the
environment undergoes gradual or sudden changes. Our proposed surprise-
modulated belief update algorithm provides a framework to study the behav-
ior of humans and animals encountering surprising events.
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1 Introduction
Humans and animals rely on previously learned knowledge to guide their behavior. A crucial
challenge when collecting new data in uncertain environments is the balance between new and
old information. How much should we trust what we have learned in the past and how much
should we adjust our model of the world based on newly acquired data? In noisy environments,
individual data samples are not reliable and a model needs to average over the past data. How-
ever, when a structural change occurs in the environment the most recent data samples are the
most informative ones and we would want to quickly forget what was learned in the past.
Both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old and newly ac-
quired data on learning (1–4) and rapidly adapt to changing environments (4–6). To capture
this behaviour existing models detect and respond to sudden changes using (absolute) reward
prediction errors (4, 7), risk prediction errors (8, 9), uncertainty-based jump detection (10, 11)
and hierarchical modelling (1, 12). The nature of the environmental change determines which
of these models works best. Here we aim to generalize these approaches by using surprise as a
trigger for shifting the balance between old and new information.
The Webster dictionary defines surprise as “an unexpected event, piece of information
”and “the feeling caused by something that is unexpected or unusual ”[merriam-webster.com].
Therefore, surprise is unexpectedness and represents the gap between what happens and what
was expected to happen.
Behaviorally, surprise can be identified through startle responses (13), which are vital for
humans and animals. It manifests itself as physiological responses such as pupil dilation (2,14)
and tenseness in the muscles (13), and can trigger fight-or-flight responses (15).
Neurally, the P300 component of event-related potential (16, 17) measured by electroen-
cephalography is associated with violation of expectation (18, 19). Surprising events have been
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shown to influence the development of the sensory cortex (20), and to drive attention (21), as
well as learning and memory formation (22–24).
Quantities correlated to surprise have been previously used in machine learning. Planning
to be surprised so as to maximize information gain has been suggested as an optimal explo-
ration technique in dynamic environments (25, 26). Signatures of surprise have been observed
in artificial models of curiosity and interestingness both of which drive active exploration for
learning unknown environments, in the absence of external reward (27). Furthermore, a sur-
prise measure defined as a prediction error has been optimized in the context of free energy
minimization (28).
Surprise is difficult to quantify (21, 29–32). Inspired by information theoretic approaches
we first introduce a measure of surprise to incorporate subjectivity and uncertainty, two con-
ceptually different aspects of surprise. We formulate the principle of surprise minimization
as a learning strategy and derive a class of learning rules which obey that principle. We then
propose a surprise-modulated belief update rule that can be used for learning within changing
environments. We apply our proposed method to a dynamic decision making task in a Gaussian
environment, as well as an exploration task in a maze-like environment. We demonstrate how
surprise and uncertainty interact with each other to make learning in changing environments
possible. Finally, we discuss implications of surprise in reinforcement learning and link sur-
prise and its role in learning/plasticity to existing neurophysiological evidence and behavioral
data.
2 Theory
Surprise occurs whenever there is uncertainty, be it in the world or in the model that we build
of the world. While the former corresponds to the probabilistic nature of the world, the latter is
caused by an imperfect internal model of the outside world.
3
We emphasize that surprise is subjective: events that are surprising to me may not be sur-
prising to you, although we may both have used the same data to build our models of the world.
Subjectivity may arise from different methods for building our internal models, or different
prior beliefs about the world (29, 30). Model uncertainty differs from subjectivity in that the
former refers to uncertainty in parameter estimation given the available data that remains even
in the ”best” model (e.g., Bayes-optimal). The latter incorporates individual differences in the
construction of a (potentially suboptimal) model given identical data.
In order to quantify surprise, we assume that the world is governed by a set of parameters θ∗
chosen by nature. If θ∗ is known, the information content − ln p(X|θ∗) for a specific outcome
X ∈ X is a measure of surprise (30–32) which says that the occurrence of a rare (i.e., unlikely
to occur) data sample X is surprising. As the information content relates to the true probabil-
ities p(X|θ∗) of samples in the real world, it is an objective, model-independent, measure of
unexpectedness. However, the true set of parameters θ∗, and so the true probability p(X|θ∗), is
rarely known to the observer, such that it is difficult to evaluate the exact information content of
a data sample X .
The Bayesian framework bypasses this issue by modeling the world as a joint distribution
p(X, θ) = p(X|θ)pi0(θ) which specifies how data X is generated if the model parameter is
θ ∈ Θ. The prior distribution pi0(θ) represents the current belief of the observer about the
likelihood of the world having parameters θ. We define the raw surprise Sraw(X; pi0) of a data
sample X as
Sraw(X; pi0) := −
∫
Θ
pi0(θ) ln p(X|θ) dθ, (1)
where we replaced the exact information content with a weighted average over all possible
model parameters. In contrast to the information content, the raw surprise (1) is a subjective,
model-dependent, measure of unexpectedness. Therefore, the same data point X might differ-
ently surprise different people, as they may have different beliefs pi0(θ) about model parameters.
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2.1 Confidence-corrected surprise
In addition to the raw surprise (1) being subjective we would also like to capture the impact of a
subject’s confidence in her belief. Intuitively, if we are uncertain about what to expect (because
we have not yet learned the structure of the world), receiving a data sample that occurs with
low probability under the present model is less surprising than a low-probability sample in a
situation when we are almost certain about the world (see Fig.1A). Our confidence about the
current model of the world is represented by the entropyH(pi0) = −
∫
Θ
pi0(θ) lnpi0(θ)dθ of our
current belief about the model parameters. To arrive at the confidence-corrected surprise, we
first subtract the entropyH(pi0) of our current belief from the raw surprise, i.e.,
Sraw(X; pi0)−H(pi0) =
∫
Θ
pi0(θ) ln
pi0(θ)
p(X|θ) dθ. (2)
While the right-hand side of equation (2) is reminiscent of a KL divergence (between pi0(θ)
and p(X|θ) as a function of θ), the likelihood function p(X|θ) is not a correctly normalized
probability distribution function with respect to θ. To rewrite equation (2) as a KL divergence,
we divide the likelihood p(X|θ) by a scaling factor ||pX || =
∫
Θ
p(X|θ′) dθ′. The scaled like-
lihood pˆX(θ) =
p(X|θ)
||pX || can be considered as a probability distribution function over θ, just like
the prior pi0(θ). The normalization corresponds to calculating the posterior under a flat prior
(see Appendix A). The divergence DKL[pi0(θ)||pˆX(θ)] is a well-defined quantity, which we use
to define the confidence-corrected surprise
Scorr(X; pi0) = DKL[pi0(θ)||pˆX(θ)] =
∫
Θ
pi0(θ) ln
pi0(θ)
pˆX(θ)
dθ. (3)
The confidence-corrected surprise measure (3) represents the difference between what we
expected to happen (as indicated by the current belief pi0(θ)) and what actually happened in the
world: the relevance of a new data point X is indicated by the (scaled) likelihood pˆX(θ). As
such we have defined a surprise measure that meets our requirements: a subjective, confidence-
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adjusted measure of the difference between expectation and realization. We emphasize that the
confidence-corrected surprise is evaluated for each data point X separately.
2.2 Surprise minimization: the SMiLe-rule
Successful learning implies an adaptation to the environment such that an event occurring for
a second time is perceived as less surprising than the first time. In the following surprise
minimization refers to a learning strategy which modifies the internal model of the external
world such that the unexpected observation becomes less surprising if it happens again in the
near future. Surprise minimization is akin to - though more general than - reward prediction
error learning. Reward based learning modifies the reward expectation such that a recurring
reward results in a smaller reward prediction error. Similarly, surprise-minimization learning
results in a smaller surprise for recurring events.
To mathematically formulate learning through surprise minimization, we define a learning
rule L(X, pi0) as a mapping from a prior belief pi0(θ) to a posterior belief q(θ) after receiving
data sample X , i.e., q = L(X, pi0). Moreover, we define a belief update as the learning step
after a single data sample.
We define the class L of plausible learning rules as the set of those learning rules L for
which the surprise S(X; q) of any data sample X under the posterior belief q(θ) is at most as
surprising as the surprise S(X; pi0) of that data sample under the prior belief pi0(θ), i.e.,
L = {L : S(X; q) ≤ S(X; pi0), q = L(X, pi0),∀X ∈ X}. (4)
In other words, if the same data sample X occurs a second time right after a belief update, it is
perceived as less surprising than the first time.
After the belief update we can measure how much the new data X has impacted the internal
model by comparing the surprise of data sample X under the posterior belief to its surprise
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under the prior belief:
∆S(X;L) = S(X; pi0)− S(X; q). (5)
Given a learning rule L, a data sample X is considered more effective for a belief update
than X ′, if ∆S(X;L) > ∆S(X ′;L). Note that definitions (4, 5) do not depend on our specific
choice of surprise measure S. In the following we choose S to be the confidence-corrected
surprise Scorr (3).
The impact function ∆Scorr(X;L) (5), for a given data sample X , is maximized by the
learning rule that maps the prior belief pi0(θ) to the scaled likelihood pˆX(θ). However, as this
posterior distribution q = pˆX does not depend on the prior belief pi0, it discards all previously
learned information. Therefore, it amounts to a valid though meaningless solution.
To avoid overfitting to the last data sample, we need to limit our search to posteriors q that
are not too different from the prior pi0. This limited set can be expressed as the set of posteriors
q that fulfill the constraint DKL[q||pi0] ≤ B, for some non-negative upper bound B ≥ 0. The
parameter B determines how much we allow our belief to change after receiving a data sample
X . Maximizing the impact function ∆Scorr(X;L) under such a constraint, is equivalent to the
following constraint optimization problem:
min
q:DKL[q||pi0]≤B
Scorr(X; q). (6)
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers we find the solution of problem (6) to be
qγ(θ) =
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ
Z(X; γ)
, (7)
where Z(X; γ) =
∫
Θ
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ dθ is a normalizing factor and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is uniquely
determined by the bound B (see Appendix B for the proof). The unique relationship between γ
and B means that once B has been chosen, γ is no longer a free parameter and vice versa.
We call the learning rule (7) surprise minimization learning (SMiLe). It is reminiscent
of Bayes’ rule except for the parameter γ which modulates the relative contribution of the
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likelihood p(X|θ) and the prior pi0(θ) to the posterior q(θ). Note that the SMiLe rule belongs
to the class L of plausible learning rules, for all 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Choosing γ in the range 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is equivalent to choosing a bound B ≥ 0. To understand
how the optimal solution (7) - and thus γ - relates to the boundary B, we illustrate its limiting
cases (see Fig. 1B): (i) B = 0 yields γ = 0 and the posterior q is identical to the prior pi0.
In other words, the new information is discarded. (ii) For B ≥ Bmax = DKL[pˆX ||pi0], the
solution is always the scaled likelihood pˆX (corresponding to γ = 1) because q = pˆX fulfills the
constraint DKL[q||pi0] ≤ B for any B ≥ Bmax and minimizes Scorr(X; q) among all posteriors
q. This is equivalent to the unconstrained case, and implies that all previous information is
discarded. (iii) For 0 < B < Bmax the optimal solution is the posterior qγ , Eq. (7), with
0 < γ < 1 satisfying DKL[qγ||pi0] = B. Moreover, B > B′ implies γ > γ′ (see Fig. 1B).
While the SMiLe rule (7) depends on a parameter γ which is uniquely determined by the
bound B we have yet to indicate how to choose B. Highly surprising data should result in
larger belief shifts. As such, the bound B should increase with the level of surprise. We choose
a simple monotonic function to link the bound to the surprise. In the following, for each data
sample X , we take
B(X) =
mScorr(X; pi0)
1 +mScorr(X; pi0)
Bmax(X), (8)
where Bmax(X) = DKL[pˆX ||pi0]. Here, the monotonic function depends on a subject-specific
parameter m that describes an organism’s propensity toward changing its belief. Note that in
Eq. (8) m = 0 indicates that the subject will never change her belief. As m increases so does a
subject’s willingness to change her belief. Thus, differences in m from one subject to the next
will eventually allow us to capture heterogeneity in belief update strategies.
The exact link between the bound and surprise is not crucial as long as B is monotonic in
surprise in a reasonable way. Note that biological correlates of surprise such as pupil dilation
or the activity of a neuromodulator will normally saturate at some maximal value - consistent
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with our choice of a saturating function in Eq. (8).
2.3 Surprise-modulated belief update
The surprise-modulated belief update combines the confidence corrected surprise (3) and the
SMiLe rule (7) to dynamically update our belief: after receiving a new data pointX , we evaluate
the surprise Scorr(X; pi0) which sets the bound for our update and allows us to solve for γ. We
then update the belief, using the SMiLe rule (7) with parameter γ (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Pseudo algorithm for surprise-modulated belief update (SMiLe)
1: N ← number of data samples
2: Belief ← pi0 (the prior belief)
3: m← 0.1 (subject-dependent)
4: for n: 1 to N do
5: Xn ← a new data sample
6: (i) evaluate the surprise Scorr(Xn; Belief), Eq. (3)
7: (ii-a) calculate Bmax(Xn) = DKL[pˆXn||Belief]
8: (ii-b) choose the bound B(Xn) =
mScorr(Xn;Belief)
1+mScorr(Xn;Belief)
Bmax(Xn)
9: (iii) find γ by solving DKL[qγ||Belief] = B(Xn)
10: (iv) update using SMiLe, Eq. (7): Belief(θ)← p(Xn|θ)γBelief(θ)1−γ∫
Θ p(Xn|θ)γBelief(θ)1−γ dθ
11: Return Belief;
Note 1: In each iteration, we first calculate the surprise, step (i), before the model is updated
in step (iv).
Note 2: The steps (ii-a), (ii-b), and (iii) can be merged and approximated by γ =
f(Scorr(Xn; Belief)) where f(.) is a subjective function that increases with surprise.
The parameter γ in the SMiLe rule (7) controls the impact of a data sample X on be-
lief update such that a bigger γ causes a larger impact. More precisely, the impact function
∆Scorr(X,L) (5), where L is replaced by the SMiLe rule (7), is an increasing function of γ (see
Appendix C for the proof).
We note that in classical models of perception and attention (21, 29), surprise has been
defined as a measure of belief change (such as DKL[qγ||pi0] or its mirror form DKL[pi0||qγ]). We
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emphasize that our model of surprise is ”fast” in the sense that it can be evaluated before the
beliefs are changed. Interestingly, the impact function is linked to the measures of belief change
by the following equation (see Appendix D for derivation),
∆Scorr(X,L) =
1
γ
DKL[pi0||qγ] + ( 1
γ
− 1)DKL[qγ||pi0] ≥ 0. (9)
Therefore a larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in belief.
3 Simulations
In the following we will look at two examples to illustrate the functionality of our proposed
surprise-modulated belief update algorithm 1. The first is a simple, one-dimensional, dynamic
decision making task which has been used in behavioral studies (1, 2) of learning under uncer-
tainty. While somewhat artificial as a task, it is appealing as it nicely isolates different forms
of uncertainty. This allows us to (i) demonstrate the basic quantities and properties of our al-
gorithm and (ii) show how its flexibility allows it to capture a wide range of behaviours. The
second example is a multi-dimensional maze-exploration task which we will use to demon-
strate how our algorithm extends to and performs in more complex and realistic experimental
environments.
3.1 Gaussian estimation
Task. In the one-dimensional dynamic decision making task subjects are asked to estimate the
mean of a distribution based on consecutively and independently drawn samples. At each time
step n, a data sampleXn is drawn from a normal distributionN (µn, σ2x) and the subject is asked
to provide her current estimate µˆn of the mean of the distribution. Throughout the experiment,
the mean may change without warning (Fig. 2A). Changes occur with a hazard rate 0.066. The
variance σ2x remains fixed.
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Model. We model the subject’s belief before the n-th sample Xn is observed, as the nor-
mal distribution N (µˆn−1, σ2n−1) where µˆn−1 is the estimated mean and σ2n−1 determines how
uncertain the subject is about her estimation. In order to keep the scenario as simple as possi-
ble, we assume σ20 = σ
2
x. The posterior mean µˆn resulting from the surprise-modulated belief
update (algorithm 1) is a weighted average of the prior mean µˆn−1 and the new sample Xn (see
Appendix E for derivation),
µˆn = γXn + (1− γ)µˆn−1. (10)
The weight factor, that determines to what extent a new sample Xn affects the posterior
mean µˆn, is determined by γ which increases with the surprise Scorr(Xn) of that sample (Fig.
2B), i.e.,
γ =
√
mScorr(Xn)
1 +mScorr(Xn)
, Scorr(Xn) =
(Xn − µˆn−1)2
2σ2x
. (11)
Note that in this example, the confidence-corrected surprise measure is related to the nor-
malized unsigned prediction error |Xn − µˆn−1|/σx. This outcome of our SMiLe-update is con-
sistent with recent approaches in reward learning that suggest to use reward prediction errors
scaled by standard deviation or variance (8).
Results. The confidence-corrected surprise increases suddenly in response to the samples
immediately after the change points, as they are unexpected under the current prior. As a con-
sequence, surprising samples increase the influence of a new data sample on the posterior mean
(Fig. 2B). We can compare our surprise modulated belief update in Eqs. (10), (11) with a
delta-rule (10) with constant weighting factor γ. To enable a fair comparison we consider two
situations: (i) we arbitrarily fix γ at 0.5 or (ii) for a given hazard rate H we first search for
the optimal value of fixed γ so as to minimize the estimation error (Fig. 2C). We find that
our surprise-modulated belief update outperforms the delta-rule with any constant learning rate
(Fig. 2D). This clearly shows that an adaptive learning rate is preferable to a fixed learning rate.
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We also compared our proposed algorithm with a delta-rule that approximates the optimal
Bayesian solution (10). In the optimal model the subjects knows a-priori that the mean will
change at unknown points in time, leading to a hierarchical statistical model of the world.
The algorithm proposed in (10) provides an efficient approximate algorithm to estimate the
parameters of the hierarchical model. In this algorithm, the subject increases the learning rate
as a function of probability of encountering a change point at a given time step. This probability
requires knowledge or online estimation of the hazard rate, which indicates how frequently
change points occur. Although our surprise-modulated belief update does not outperform the
approximate Bayesian delta-rule, the difference in performance is, in most cases, not significant
(see Fig. 2D). In other words, our method, which does not require any information about the
hazard rate, can approximate the quality of the optimal Bayesian solution, with significantly
reduced computational complexity.
3.2 Maze exploration
Task. The maze exploration task is similar to tasks used in behavioral neuroscience and robotics
(33–35). There are two environments A and B each composed of the same uniquely labeled
(e.g., by colors or cue cards) rooms. A and B only differ in the topology / spatial arrangement of
rooms (see Fig. 3). Neighboring rooms are connected and accessible through doors. Initially,
the agent is placed into either A or B. At each time step a door of the current room opens
and the agent moves into the adjacent room, thus exploring the environment. After a random
exploration time the environment is switched. Once it is changed, the agent must quickly adapt
to the new environment. Note that this task differs from a reinforcement learning task because
the task at hand just consists of the exploration phase. In particular, there is no reward involved
in learning.
Model. We model the knowledge of the environment by a learning agent that updates a
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set of parameters α(s, sˇ) ≥ 1 used for describing its belief about state transitions from s ∈
{1, 2, ..., 16} to sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\s, where 16 is the number of rooms. More precisely, an
agent’s belief about how likely it is to visit sˇ, given the current state s, is modeled by a Dirichlet
distribution parametrized by a vector of parameters ~α(s) ∈ R15. The components of the vector
~α(s) are denoted as α(s, sˇ).
The surprise-modulated belief update (algo 1), with the Dirichlet distribution inserted, yields
algorithm 2 for the maze exploration task (see Appendix F for derivation). Immediately after
a transition from the current state s to the next state s′, the posterior belief qγ obtained by the
SMiLe rule (7) is a Dirichlet distribution ~αnew(s) with components αnew(s, sˇ) = γ(1 + [sˇ =
s′]) + (1− γ)αold(s, sˇ), that can be written as a weighted average of the parameters of the prior
belief pi0 (i.e., αold(s, sˇ)) and those of the scaled likelihood pˆX (i.e., 1 + [sˇ = s′]). Here, [sˇ = s′]
indicates a number that is 1 if the condition in square brackets is satisfied, and 0 otherwise.
In order to see how well our proposed surprise-modulated belief update algorithm per-
forms in this task, we compare it with a naive Bayesian learner and an online expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm (36). While in the former the agent assumes that there is only
a single stable, but stochastic environment, the latter benefits from knowing the true hidden
Markov model (HMM) of the task and approximates the optimal hierarchical Bayesian solution
(see Appendix G).
Results. Similar to the Gaussian mean estimation task, surprise is initially high and slowly
decreases as the agent learns the topology of the environment (Fig. 4A). When the environment
is switched, the sudden increase in the surprise signal (Fig. 4A) causes the parameter γ to in-
crease (Fig. 4B). This is equivalent to discounting previously learned information and results
in a quick adaptation to the new environment. To quantify the adaptation to the new environ-
ment, we compare the state transition probabilities of the current model with the true transition
probabilities of the two environments. We find that the estimation error of the state transition
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Algorithm 2 Surprise-modulated belief update for the maze exploration task
1: N ← number of data samples
2: α(s, sˇ) = 1, ∀s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}, sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\{s} (a uniform prior belief)
3: m← 0.1 (subject-dependent)
4: Start in state s
5: for n: 1 to N do
# at this time step we only update the parameters that describe state transitions from
the current state s to all possible next states sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 16}\{s}. The prior belief, for the
state s, is pi0 ∼ Dir(a), a ∈ R15, a(sˇ) = α(s, sˇ).
6: Xn : s→ s′ (a new transition is observed)
# the scaled likelihood is pˆX ∼ Dir(b),b ∈ R15, b(sˇ) = 1 + [sˇ = s′]
7: (i) Scorr(Xn; pi0) = DKL[Dir(a)||Dir(b)]
8: (ii-a) Bmax(Xn) = DKL[Dir(b)||Dir(a)]
9: (ii-b) B(Xn) =
mScorr(Xn;pi0)
1+mScorr(Xn;pi0)
Bmax(Xn)
10: (iii) find γ by solving DKL[Dir(γb + (1− γ)a)||Dir(a)] = B(Xn)
11: (iv) α(s, sˇ)← (1− γ)α(s, sˇ) + γ(1 + [sˇ = s′])
12: Return α(s, sˇ),∀s, sˇ;
Note 1: DKL[Dir(m)||Dir(n)] = ln Γ(
∑
sˇ m(sˇ)) − ln Γ(
∑
sˇ n(sˇ)) −
∑
sˇ ln Γ(m(sˇ)) +∑
sˇ ln Γ(n(sˇ)) +
∑
sˇ(m(sˇ)− n(sˇ))(Ψ(m(sˇ))−Ψ(
∑
sˇ m(sˇ))).
Note 2: Γ(.) and Ψ(.) denote the gamma and digamma functions, respectively. [sˇ = s′]
denotes the Iverson bracket, a number that is 1 if the condition in square brackets is satisfied,
and 0 otherwise.
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probabilities in the new environment is quickly reduced after the switch points (Fig. 4C). Fol-
lowing a change point, the model uncertainty, measured as the entropy of the current belief
about the state transition probabilities, increases indicating that the current model of the topol-
ogy is inaccurate (Fig. 4D). A few time steps later the uncertainty slowly decreases, indicating
increased confidence in what is learned in the new environment.
If we look more closely at the model parameters, we find that the surprise-modulated belief
update (algorithm 2) enables the agent to adjust the estimated state transition probabilities. In
Fig. 5 we compare the estimated and the true transition probabilities 100 time steps after a
switch. Given that the environment is characterized by 64 different transitions (in a space of
16 × 15 = 240 potential transitions), 100 time steps allow an agent to explore only a fraction
of the potential transitions. Nevertheless, 100 time steps after a switch the matrix of transition
probabilities already resembles that of the present environment (Figs. 5C, 5D).
Surprise-modulated belief update is a method of quick learning. How well does our SMiLe
update rule perform to other existing models? We compared it with two well-known models.
First, a naive Bayesian learner which tries to estimate the 240 state transition probabilities, by
Bayes rule. Note that, by construction, the naive Bayesian learner is not aware of the switches
between the environments. Second, a hierarchical statistical model that reflects the architecture
of the true world as in Fig. 3. The task is to estimate the 2 × 240 state transitions in the two
environments as well as transition probabilities between the environments pA→B and pB→A by
an online EM algorithm.
For the naive Bayesian learner, we find that its behavior indicates a steady increase in cer-
tainty, regardless of how surprising the samples are. In other words, it is incapable of changing
its belief after it has sufficiently explored the environments (Fig. 4C). The state transition prob-
abilities are estimated by averaging over the true parameters of both environment, where the
weight of averaging is determined by the fraction of time spent in the corresponding environ-
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ment (Figs. 5E, 5F).
The comparison of our surprise modulated belief update with the online EM algorithm for
the hierarchical Bayesian model associated with the switching environments, provides several
insights (see Fig. 6). First, already after less than 1000 time steps, the estimation error for
environment A during short episodes in environment A drops below EA = 0.002. Only after
10000 time steps, the online EM algorithm achieves the same level of accuracy. While the
solution of the SMiLe rule in the long run is not as good, our algorithm benefits from a reduced
computational complexity and simpler implementation.
To further investigate the ability of an agent to adapt to the new environment after a switch,
we analyzed performance as a function of two free parameters that control the setting of the task:
(i) the fraction of time spent in environment A, and (ii) the average time spent in environment
A before a switch to B occurs. To do so, we calculate the average estimation error in state
transition probabilities 64 time steps after a switch occurs. We consider only those switches
after which the agent stays in that environment for at least 64 time steps. Note that 64 is the
minimum number of time steps that is required to make sure that all possible transitions from
16 room to their 4 neighbors could occur. A smaller estimation error for a given pair of free
parameters indicates a faster adaptation to the new environment for that setting.
We found that the surprise-modulated belief enables an agent to quickly readjust its esti-
mation of model parameters, even if the fraction of time spent in an environment is relatively
short. In that sense, it behaves similarly to the approximated hierarchical Bayesian approach
(online EM algorithm). This is not, however, the case for a naive Bayesian learner whose es-
timation error in each environment depends on the fraction of time spent in that corresponding
environment (see Fig. 7).
The naive Bayesian learner suffers from low accuracy in estimation and cannot adapt to
environmental changes. A full hierarchical Bayesian model, however, requires prior informa-
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tion about the task and is computationally demanding. For example, the computational load of
the hierarchical Bayesian model increases with the number N of environments between which
switching occurs. The surprise-modulated belief update, however, balances accuracy and com-
putational complexity: computational complexity remains, by construction, independent of the
number of switched environments.
4 Discussion
Surprise is a widely used concept describing a range of phenomena from unexpected events
to behavioral responses. Existing approaches to quantifying surprise are either data-centered
(30–32) or model-centered (29, 37) and may be objective (31, 32) or subjective (29, 30, 37) but
are always linked to uncertainty. We emphasize that, in order for surprise to be behaviorally
meaningful, it has to be defined for a single data sample such that an organism can respond to
a single event. In contrast, information theoretic quantities, such as data entropy and mutual
information, are usually defined as average quantities.
Based on our definition of surprise, we proposed a new framework for surprise-driven learn-
ing. There are two components to this framework: (i) a confidence-adjusted surprise measure
to capture environmental statistics as well as subjective beliefs, (ii) the surprise-minimization
learning rule, or SMiLe-rule, which dynamically adjusts the balance between new and old infor-
mation without prior assumptions about the temporal statistics in the environment. Within this
framework, the surprise is a single subject-specific variable that determines a subject’s propen-
sity to modify existing beliefs. This algorithm is suitable for learning in complex environments
that are either stable or undergo gradual or sudden changes. The latter are signaled by high sur-
prise and result in placing more weight on new information. The significance of the proposed
method is that it neither requires knowledge of the full Bayesian model of the environment
nor any prior assumption about the temporal statistics in the environment. Moreover, it pro-
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vides a simple framework that could potentially implemented in a neurally plausible way using
probabilistic population codes (38, 39).
Relation to Bayesian surprise
One of the existing approaches for measuring surprise is Bayesian surprise (21, 29) which
is generally defined as a distance or dissimilarity measure between prior and posterior beliefs.
According to this measure, a data sample X is more surprising than a data sample X ′ if it
causes a larger change in the subject’s belief. One of the shortcomings of the Bayesian surprise
is that it is computed only after learning (i.e., once we have changed our belief from prior to
posterior). However, behavioral and neural responses indicate that surprise is concurrent with
the unexpected event. Our working hypothesis is that the brain evaluates surprise even before
recognition, inference or learning occurs. We thus need to evaluate surprise before we update
our belief such that surprise may control learning rather than emerge from it. This property is
fulfilled in the confidence-corrected surprise measure introduced in this paper.
Information content and Bayesian surprise are two distinct yet complementary approaches to
measuring surprise. Information content is about data as it captures the inherent unexpectedness
of a piece of data given a model. While its calculation is instantaneous and objective, it suffers
from not knowing the true underlying parameter θ∗. Bayesian surprise is about a model. Since
it measures the change in belief (i.e., in the model parameters), it is subjective and does not
require knowing θ∗. However, it is computed only after learning, which is inconsistent with
behavioral and neural data that suggest an instantaneous response to surprise. Our definition of
raw surprise combines these two measures to use their complementary benefits and overcome
their shortcomings (see Appendix H).
New versus old information
The proposed algorithm’s performance is primarily driven by two features: (i) the algorithm
adaptively increases the influence of new data on the belief update as a function of how surpris-
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ing the data was; (ii) the algorithm increases model uncertainty in the face of surprising data
thus increasing the influence of new data on current and future belief updates. The importance
of the first point has been recognized and incorporated previously (2, 4). The second point is
particularly worth noting: a surprising sample not only signals a potential change, it also signals
that our current model may be wrong, so that we should be less certain about its accuracy. This
increase in model uncertainty implies discounting the influence of past information in current
and future belief updates.
Both humans and animals adaptively adjust the relative contribution of old and newly ac-
quired data on learning (1–4) and rapidly adapt to changing environments (4–6). Standard
Bayesian and reinforcement learning models in humans (40) or animals (41, 42) assume a sta-
ble environment and are slow to adapt to sudden changes in the environment. To quickly learn in
dynamic environments, models need to include a way to detect and respond to sudden changes.
A full (hierarchical) Bayesian approach works only if the subject is aware of the correct model
of the task, (e.g., the time scale of change in the environment or the number of environments
between which switches occur). Calculating the probability of a change point in a Gaussian
estimation task (10), estimating the volatility of the environment in a reversal learning task (1),
and dynamically forgetting the past information with a controlled time constant (43) are all ex-
amples of addressing learning in changing environments without explicit knowledge of the full
Bayesian model.
In changing environments, hierarchical Bayesian models outperform the standard delta-rule
with a fixed learning rate. However, hierarchical models either make assumptions about how
fast the world is changing on average or about the underlying data generating process, in order
to accurately detect a change in the environment. While our proposed surprise-based algorithm
may not be theoretically optimal, it approximates the optimal (hierarchical) Bayesian solution
without making any such assumption.
19
Model uncertainty
The ability of our proposed method to increase model uncertainty solves a common problem
in standard Bayesian learning, namely, a model uncertainty or a learning rate approaching zero
when the number of data samples increases. This is particularly prominent in Bayes’ rule which
is derived under the assumption of stationarity and which thus reduces posterior uncertainty in
each step no matter how surprising a sample is. The SMiLe rule (7) guarantees that a small
model uncertainty remains even after a long stationary period. This remaining uncertainty en-
sures that an organism can still detect a change even after having spent an extensive amount of
time in a given environment (see Fig. 4C). One might argue, that reducing the learning rate to
zero after extensive training is desirable under certain conditions as it corresponds to the well-
documented phenomenon of overtraining whereby an organism no longer responds to changes
in goal value. We would argue that this insensitivity is a consequence of behavioral control
being handed over to the habitual system and thus to a different neural substrate (44–46).
Potential applications
Surprise minimization is a more general approach for learning than learning by reward pre-
diction error. Recent approaches in reward learning suggest to use a scaled reward prediction
error (8). A recurring problem in reward-based learning is the observation that subjects use
different learning rates on a trial-by-trial basis even in stable environments. Researchers typi-
cally assume an average learning rate for fitting data. Note that in our approach, the learning
rate varies naturally as a function of the last data point (as it should) while keeping the subject-
specific parameter m constant.
Note that both confidence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule have wide-reaching impli-
cations outside the framework presented here. On the one hand, our surprise measure can not
only modulate learning, but can be used as a trigger signal for an algorithm that needs to choose
between several uncertain states or actions as is the case in change point detection (10, 43, 47),
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memory and cluster formation (48), exploration/exploitation tradeoff (49, 50), novelty detec-
tion (51,52), and network reset (53). On the other hand, the SMiLe-rule could add flexibility in
learning and replace existing learning algorithms in scenarios where dynamically balancing old
and new information is desired. This includes fitting γ to behavioral data without computing
surprise or controlling γ by something other than surprise. Replacing the full Bayesian model
of a learning task in changing environment with the SMile rule simplifies calculations, which
makes the SMiLe-framework suitable to fit relevant parameters to behavioral data.
Experimental predictions.
There is ample evidence for a neural substrate of surprise. Existing measures of expecta-
tion violations such as absolute and variance-scaled reward prediction errors (54, 55), unex-
pected uncertainty (56) and risk prediction errors (9) have been linked to different neuromod-
ulatory systems. Among those, the noradrenergic system has emerged as a prime candidate
for signalling unexpected uncertainty and surprise: noradrenergic neurons respond to unex-
pected changes such as the presence of a novel stimulus, unexpected pairing of stimulus with a
reinforcement during conditioning, and reversal of the contingencies (57–60). The P300 com-
ponent of ERP (16, 17) which is associated with novelty (61) and surprise (18) is modulated
by Noradrenaline (NE). It also modulates pupil size (62, 63) as a physiological response to sur-
prise. The dynamics of noradrenergic system is fast enough to quickly respond to unexpected
events (64–66), a functional requirement for surprise to control learning; see (53, 67, 68) for a
review. We predict that, in experiments with changing environments, the activity of NE should
exhibit a high correlation with the confidence-corrected surprise signal.
Note that Acetylcholine (ACh), on the other hand, is a candidate neuromodulator for encod-
ing expected uncertainty (56) and thus is linked to the model uncertainty (although it might also
be linked to other forms of uncertainty such as environmental stochasticity).
A variety of experimental findings are consistent with and can be explained by our definition
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of confidence-corrected surprise and the SMiLe rule. It has been shown both theoretically (56)
and empirically (69) that NE and ACh interact such that ACh sets a threshold for NE to indicate
fundamental changes in the environment (56). This is consistent with our hypothesis that if
an agent is uncertain about its current model of the world, unexpected events are perceived less
surprising than when the agent is almost certain about its model (the idea behind the confidence-
corrected surprise). The impairment of adaptation to contextual changes due to NE depletion
(70) can be explained by incapability of subjects in responding to surprising events signaled by
NE. The absence/suppression of ACh (low model uncertainty) implies little or no variability of
the environment such that even small prediction error signals are perceived as surprising (71),
consistent with the excessive activation of NE system in such situations.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that NE and ACh both affect synaptic plasticity in
the cortex and the hippocampus (69, 72), suppress cortical processing (73, 74) and facilitate
information processing from thalamus to the cerebral cortex (75–77). This is consistent with our
theory that surprise balances the influence of the newly acquired data (thalamocortical pathway)
and old information (corticocortical pathway) during belief update.
In summary, we proposed a measure of surprise and a surprise-modulated belief update algo-
rithm that can be used for modeling how humans and animals learn in changing environments.
Our results suggest that the proposed method can approximate an optimal Bayesian learner,
but with significantly reduced computational complexity. Our model provides a framework for
future studies on learning with surprise. This include computational studies, such as how the
proposed model can be neurally implemented, and neurobiological studies, such as unraveling
the interaction between different neural circuits that are functionally involved in learning under
surprise.
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Figure 1: A. The impact of confidence on surprise. Top: Two distinct internal models (red
and blue), described by joint distributions p(x, θ) (contour plots) over observable data x and
model parameters θ, may have the same marginal distribution Z(x) =
∫
θ
p(x, θ)dθ (distribu-
tions along the x-axis coincide) but differ in the marginal distribution pi0(θ) =
∫
x
p(x, θ)dx
(distributions along the θ-axis). Surprise measures that are computed with respect to Z(x) ne-
glect the uncertainty as measured by the entropy H(pi0). Therefore, a given data sample X
(green dot) may equally be surprising in terms of the raw surprise Sraw(X) (1) but results in
higher confidence-corrected surprise Scorr(X) (3) for the blue as compared to the red model,
because pi0 in the red model is wider (corresponding to a larger entropy) than in the blue model.
Bottom: The scaled likelihood pˆX(θ) (magenta) for the ”red” internal model is calculated by
evaluating the conditional probability distribution functions p(x|θi) (specified by different color
for each θi) at x = X (intersection of dashed green line with colored curves). The confidence-
corrected surprise Scorr(X) is the KL divergence between pˆX(θ) (bottom, magenta) and pi0(θ)
(top, red). B. Solutions to the (constraint) optimization problem (6). The objective function, i.e.
the posterior surprise Scorr(X; q) (black) for a given data sample X , is a parabolic landscape
over γ where each γ corresponds to a unique posterior qγ . Its global minimum is at γ = 1
(corresponding to q1 = pˆX) which is equivalent to discarding all previously observed sam-
ples. The boundary B constrains the range of γ and thus the set of admissible posteriors. At
B = 0 no change is allowed resulting in γ = 0 with a posterior equals to the prior pi0 (green).
B ≥ Bmax = DKL[pˆX ||pi0] (red dashed line) implies that we allow posteriors that are further
away from the prior than the sample itself so the optimal solution is the scaled likelihood pˆX or
γ = 1 as for the unconstrained problem. For 0 < B < Bmax (blue dashed line) the objective
function is minimized by qγ (Eq. 7) that fulfills the constraintDKL[qγ||pi0] = B with 0 < γ < 1.
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Figure 2: Gaussian mean estimation task. At each time step, a data sample Xn is indepen-
dently drawn from a normal distribution whose underlying mean may change within the interval
[−20, 20] at unpredictable change points. On average, the underlying mean remains unchanged
for 15 time steps corresponding to a hazard rate H = 0.066. The standard deviation of the
distribution is fixed to 4 and is assumed to be known to the subject. A. Using a surprise-
modulated belief update (algorithm 1), the estimated mean (blue) quickly approaches the true
mean (dashed red) given observed samples (black circles). A few selected change points are
indicated by green arrows. B. The weight factor γ (Eq. 11) (magenta) increases at the change
points, resulting in higher influence of newly acquired data samples on the posterior mean. C.
The estimation error  per time step versus the weight factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 in the delta-rule method
with constant γ for four different hazard rates. The minimum estimation error (for best fixed γ)
is achieved by a γ (points on the horizontal axis) that decreases with the hazard rate, indicating
that a bigger γ is preferred in volatile environments. Error bars indicate standard deviation over
all trials and 50 episodes. D. For all models, the average estimation error  increases with the
hazard rate. Moreover, surprise-modulated belief update (SMile, dark blue) outperforms the
delta-rule with the best fixed γ (Best fixed γ, yellow). The best fixed γ for each hazard rate
corresponds to the learning rate that has minimal estimation error (indicated by points on the
horizontal axis in sub-figure C). Although the surprise-modulated SMile rule performs worse
than the approximate Bayesian delta-rule (10) (App. Bayes, light blue), the difference in the
performance is not significant, except for the very small hazard rate of 0.01.
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Figure 3: Maze exploration task. Environments A (left) and B (right) both consist of 16 rooms,
but differ in topology. At each time step, one of the four available doors (up, down, right,
left) in the current room (e.g. s = 6) is randomly opened (with probability 0.25). While
the learning agent is in environment A, the environment may change to B with probability
PA→B ≤ 0.1 in the next time step of duration ∆t. Similarly, PB→A indicates the environment
switches from B to A. Therefore, as the agent starts moving out of state s = 6, depending on
the current environment and switch probabilities PA→B and PB→A, it will end up in environment
A (i.e., s′ ∈ {2, 10, 7, 5}) or B (i.e., s′ ∈ {10, 1, 3, 13}). The duration of a stay in environment
A is therefore exponentially distributed with mean τA = ∆t/PA→B, where the parameter τA
determines the time scale of stability in environment A, i.e., for larger τA an agent has more
time for adapting to A after a change point. The expected fraction of time spent in total within
environment A is equal to ψA = PB→A/(PB→A + PA→B). Note that τA and ψA are two free
parameters that we can change to study how the agent performs in different circumstances (e.g.,
see Fig. 7).
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Figure 4: Time-series of relevant signals in the surprise-modulated belief update (algo 1 / algo
2) applied to the maze exploration task. All the curves have been smoothed with an expo-
nential moving average (EMA) with a decay constant 0.1. The plots are shown for 1100 time
steps (horizontal axis) toward the end of a simulation with 20000 time steps. The agent vis-
its environments A and B equally often and spends on average 200 time steps in each en-
vironment before a switch occurs. Red bars indicate the time that the agent explores envi-
ronment A. Blue diamonds indicate 100 time steps after a change point from B to A. A.
Confidence-corrected surprise Scorr (3) (green) increases at switch points and decreases (with
fluctuations) till the next change point. B. The parameter γ (magenta) increases with the sur-
prise at the change points and causes the next data samples to be more effective on belief
update than the samples before the change point. C. The estimation errors for the transition
matrix Tˆ , EA[t] = ||Tˆ [t] − TA||2 = 256−1
∑
s,s′ [Tˆ [t](s, s
′) − TA(s, s′)]2 (solid black) and
EB[t] = ||Tˆ [t] − TB||2 (solid yellow) while in environment A and B, respectively, indicate a
rapid adaptation to the new environment after the change points. The dashed black and yellow
lines correspond to the estimation errors EA and EB, respectively, when the naive Bayes rule
(as a control experiment) is used for belief update. Naive Bayes rule converges to a stationary
solution (no significant change in the estimation error after a switch of environment). D. The
model uncertainty (light blue) increases for a few time steps following a change of the envi-
ronment, an alert that the current model might be wrong. It then starts decreasing as the agent
becomes more certain in the new environment.
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Figure 5: True and the estimated state transition probabilities in the maze exploration task. The
color intensity for each entry (s, s′) represents the probability of transition from a current state
s (row) to a next state s′ (column). A. The true state transition probability matrix TA(s, s′)
in environment A. Each row TA(s, :) has only four non-zero entries (small squares with the
light brown color) whose position indicate the neighboring rooms of state s in environment
A. Note that ∑sˇ TA(s, sˇ) = 1 , ∀s. B. The true state transition probability matrix TB(s, s′)
for the environment B which has a different topology compared to A. C. The estimated state
transition probability matrix TˆA when the surprise-modulated algorithm 2 is used for belief
update. TˆA = K−1
∑K
k=1 Tˆ [t
k
B→A + 100] is calculated by averaging the estimated transition
matrix Tˆ [t] at 100 time steps after each of K change points tkB→A. Here, t
k
B→A denotes the
k-th time that the environment is changed from B to A and has remained unchanged for at
least the next 100 time steps (relevant time points are indicated by blue diamonds in Fig. 4).
The similarity between TˆA and TA indicates that algorithm 2 enables the agent to quickly adapt
to environment A once a switch from B to A occurs. D. The estimated transition matrix TˆB
(similarly defined as TˆA but for environment B) when algorithm 2 is used for belief update. Note
its similarity to the true matrix TB. E-F. The estimated state transition probability matrices TˆA
(up) and TˆB (down) when the naive Bayesian method (as a control experiment) is used for belief
update. A Bayesian agent does not adapt well to the new environment after a switch occurs,
because it learns a weighted average of true transition matrices TA and TB, where the weight
is proportional to the fraction of time spent in each environment. Since both environments are
visited equally in this experiment, the estimated quantities approach (TA + TB)/2.
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Figure 6: Comparison of surprise-modulated belief update with an online EM algorithm for
the hierarchical Bayesian model. A. The estimation error EA (vertical axis) of state transition
probabilities within environment A versus time (horizontal axis), for surprise-modulated belief
update (black) and online EM learner (blue). Bottom plots depict zooms during the early (left)
and late (right) phases of a simulation of 20000 time steps. In the early phase of learning (bottom
left), the surprise-modulated belief update enables the agent to quickly learn model parameters
after a switch to environment A (indicated by red bars). In the late phase of learning (right),
however, the online EM algorithm adapts to the new environment faster and more accurately
than the surprise-modulated belief update. B. The inferred probability PA of being in environ-
mentA (blue, right vertical axis) used in the online EM algorithm, and the confidence-corrected
surprise Scorr (black, left vertical axis) used in the surprise-modulated belief update.
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Figure 7: The estimation error  in the maze exploration task, as a function of (1) the average
time spent in environment A before a switch to environment B (τA = ∆t/pA→B, vertical axis)
and (2) the fraction of time spent in environment A (ψA = PB→A/(PB→A + PA→B), horizontal
axis). A. The average estimation error (of state transition probabilities), 64 time steps after a
switch from B to A, when surprise-modulated belief update (algorithm 2) is used for learning.
The spread of blue color (lower estimation error) illustrates that surprise-modulated belief up-
date enables an agent to quickly adapt to the environment visited after a switch. For each pair
(τA, ψA), the simulation is repeated for 20 episodes, each consisting of 20000 time steps. In
each episode a different rearrangement of rooms for building environment B is used to make
sure that the result is not biased by a specific choice of this environment. B. The average estima-
tion error when the online EM algorithm is used for learning the hierarchical statistical model.
C. The average estimation error when naive Bayesian learner is used for belief update. The es-
timation error for this model is mainly determined by the fraction of time spent in environment
A (i.e., ψA). The estimation error decreases with the time spent in environment A, regardless
of the time scale of stability determined by τA.
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Appendix A: The scaled likelihood is the posterior belief under a flat prior.
Assume that all model parameters θ must stay in some bounded convex interval of surface A.
Given a data sample X , the posterior belief pflat(θ|X) about the model parameters θ (derived
by the Bayes rule) under the assumption of a flat prior pˆi0(θ) = 1/A is:
pflat(θ|X) = p(X|θ)pˆi0(θ)∫
Θ
p(X|θ)pˆi0(θ) dθ =
p(X|θ)∫
Θ
p(X|θ) dθ =
p(X|θ)
||pX || = pˆX(θ). (12)
Therefore, the scaled likelihood pˆX(θ) and the prior belief pi0(θ) both belong to the space
of well-defined probability density functions for the model parameters θ. The KL divergence
between the two distributions is the confidence-corrected surprise.
Appendix B: Derivation of the SMiLe rule
We note that the KL divergence DKL[a||b] is convex with respect to the first argument, i.e., a.
Therefore, both the objective function Scorr(X; q) (3) and the constraint DKL[q||pi0] ≤ B in
the optimization problem (6) are convex with respect to q which ensures the existence of the
optimal solution.
In all appendices, small numbers above an equality sign refers to equations in the main text
or other appendices.
We solve the constraint optimization by introducing a non-negative Lagrange multiplier
λ−1 ≥ 0 and a Lagrangian
L(q, λ) = Scorr(X; q)− 1
λ
(B −DKL[q||pi0])
(2)
=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln q(θ) + 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
q
− B
λ
+ ln ||p||, (13)
where 〈.〉q denotes the average with respect to q. Similar to the standard approach that is used in
support vector machines (78), the Lagrangian L defined in (13) must be minimized with respect
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to the primal variable q and maximized with respect to the dual variable λ (i.e., a saddle point
must be found). Therefore the constraint problem (6) can be expressed as
arg min
q
max
λ≥0
L(q, λ). (14)
By taking the derivative of L with respect to q and setting it equal to zero,
∂L
∂q
= − ln p(X|θ) + [1 + ln q(θ)]+ 1
λ
[
1 + ln
q(θ)
pi0(θ)
]
= 0, (15)
we find that the Lagrangian (13) is minimized by (7), i.e., q(θ) ∝ p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ , where
0 ≤ γ = λ
λ+ 1
≤ 1, (16)
is determined by Lagrange multiplier λ. Note that the constant Z(X; γ) in (7) follows from
straight normalization of q(θ) to integral one.
Appendix C: The impact of a data sample X on belief update increases
with γ in the SMiLe rule.
To prove the statement above we need to show that the impact function ∆Scorr(X;L) (5), where
L is replaced by the SMiLe rule (7), increases with the parameter γ. In the following we show
that the first derivative of the impact function with respect to γ is always non-negative.
But first we need to evaluate the derivative of qγ(θ), Eq. (7), with respect to γ:
∂
∂γ
qγ(θ) =
1
Z(X; γ)
∂
∂γ
[
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ
]
+ p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ ∂
∂γ
[ 1
Z(X; γ)
]
=
1
Z(X; γ)
[
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ ln p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
]− p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ
Z(X; γ)2
∂
∂γ
[
Z(X; γ)
]
= qγ(θ) ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
− qγ(θ) 1
Z(X; γ)
[ ∫
Θ
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ dθ
]
= qγ(θ)
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
−
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
qγ
)
. (17)
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Note also that
∫
Θ
∂
∂γ
qγ(θ) dθ
(17)
=
∫
Θ
qγ(θ)
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
−
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
qγ
)
dθ = 0. (18)
The derivative of ∆Scorr(X, γ) with respect to γ then becomes
∂
∂γ
∆Scorr(X,L(γ)) = − ∂
∂γ
Scorr(X, qγ)
(3)
=
∫
Θ
∂
∂γ
[
qγ ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
=
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
+ qγ(θ)
∂
∂γ
[
ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
])
dθ
=
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
− 1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(7)
=
∫
Θ
(
(1− γ) ln p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
+ lnZ(X; γ)− 1
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(18)
= (1− γ)
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
)
∂
∂γ
[
qγ(θ)
]
dθ
(17)
= (1− γ)
∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
)(
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
−
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
qγ
)
qγ(θ) dθ
= (1− γ)
(∫
Θ
(
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
)2
qγ(θ) dθ −
〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
qγ
∫
Θ
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
qγ(θ) dθ
)
= (1− γ)
〈(ln p(X|θ)
qγ(θ)
)2〉
qγ
−
(〈
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
qγ
)2
= (1− γ) var[ln p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
] ≥ 0. (19)
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Appendix D: A larger reduction in the surprise implies a bigger change in
belief.
The minimal value of the Lagrangian L(q, λ) (13) that is achieved by the posterior qγ (7),
obtained by the SMiLe rule, is equal to
L(qγ, λ)
(13)
=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln qγ(θ) + 1
λ
ln
qγ(θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
qγ
=C︷ ︸︸ ︷
−B
λ
+ ln ||p||
=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln p(X|θ)
γpi0(θ)
1−γ
Z(X; γ)
+
1
λ
ln
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ
Z(X; γ)pi0(θ)
〉
qγ
+ C
=
〈
(−1 + γ + γ
λ
) ln p(X|θ) + (1− γ − γ
λ
) lnpi0 − (1 + 1
λ
) lnZ(X; γ)
〉
qγ
+ C
=
〈(
−1 + γ(1 + 1
λ
)
)
ln
p(X|θ)
pi0(θ)
− (1 + 1
λ
) lnZ(X; γ)
〉
qγ
+ C
= −1
γ
lnZ(X; γ) + C. (20)
Note that we used the equality 1
γ
= 1 + 1
λ
(Eq. 16) in the last line of Eq. (20). If the mini-
mizer qγ is approximated by any other distribution function q, then its corresponding functional
value L(q, λ) differs from its minimal value L(qγ, λ) (20) in proportion to the KL divergence
DKL[q||qγ]. This is because,
L(q, λ)− L(qγ, λ) (13),(20)=
〈
− ln p(X|θ) + ln q(θ) + 1
λ
ln
q(θ)
pi0(θ)
〉
q
+
1
γ
lnZ(X; γ)
=
1
γ
〈
− ln p(X|θ)γ + ln q(θ)γ + ln
(
q(θ)
pi0(θ)
) γ
λ
+ lnZ(X; γ)
〉
q
=
1
γ
〈
ln
q(θ)γ(1+
1
λ
)Z(X; γ)
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ) γλ
〉
q
=
1
γ
〈
ln
q(θ)Z(X; γ)
p(X|θ)γpi0(θ)1−γ
〉
q
=
1
γ
DKL[q||qγ]. (21)
43
Replacing q with pi0 in (21) follows the impact function ∆Scorr(X,L) (5) to be,
∆Scorr(X,L(γ)) = Scorr(X; pi0)− Scorr(X; qγ)
(13)
= L(pi0, λ) +
1
λ
B − L(qγ, λ)− 1
λ
(B −DKL[qγ||pi0])
= L(pi0, λ)− L(qγ, λ) + 1
λ
DKL[qγ||pi0]
(21)
=
1
γ
DKL[pi0||qγ] + 1
λ
DKL[qγ||pi0]
(16)
=
1
γ
DKL[pi0||qγ] + ( 1
γ
− 1)DKL[qγ||pi0] ≥ 0. (22)
Therefore, the reduction in the posterior surprise is related to the belief changesDKL[pi0||qγ]
and DKL[qγ||pi0] via Eq. (22). Note that the equality in (22) holds if and only if there is no
change in the prior belief, i.e., if qγ = pi0. This happens only if γ = 0 which is equivalent to the
full neglect of the new data point in deriving the posterior belief.
Appendix E: The SMiLe rule for beliefs described by Gaussian distribution
Suppose we have drawn n − 1 samples X1, ..., Xn−1 from a Gaussian distribution of known
variance σ2x, but unknown mean. The empirical mean after n− 1 samples is µˆn−1.
Assume that the current belief about the mean µ is a normal distribution, i.e., pi0(µ) ∼
N (µˆn−1, σ2n−1). Since the likelihood of receiving a new sampleXn is also normal, i.e., p(Xn|µ) ∼
N (µ, σ2x), the posterior belief obtained by the SMiLe rule (7) is
qγ(µ) ∝
(
exp
(
−(Xn − µ)
2
2σ2x
))γ (
exp
(
−(µ− µˆn−1)
2
2σ2n−1
))1−γ
∝ exp
(
−(Xn − µ)
2
2(σ′x)2
)
exp
(
−(µ− µˆn−1)
2
2(σ′n−1)2
)
, (23)
where (σ′x)
2 = σ2x/γ and (σ
′
n−1)
2 = σ2n−1/(1 − γ). Because the product of two Gaussians is a
Gaussian, we arrive at a posterior distribution qγ ∼ N (µˆn, σ2n) with the mean µˆn = wnXn +
(1 − wn)µˆn−1 (with wn = (σ
′
n−1)
2
(σ′x)2+(σ′n−1)2
), and the variance σ2n =
(
1
(σ′x)2
+ 1
(σ′n−1)2
)−1
; see (79)
for the exact derivation. Assuming σ2n−1 = σ
2
x, then wn = γ.
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Moreover, we can evaluate the confidence-corrected surprise to be
Scorr(Xn; pi0) = DKL[N (µˆn−1, σ2n−1)||N (Xn, σ2x)] =
(Xn − µˆn−1)2
2σ2x
. (24)
Note that in Eq. (24), we used the following formula (with an assumption σ2x = σ
2
n−1),
DKL[N (a1, b21)||N (a2, b22)] =
(a1 − a2)2
2b22
+
1
2
(
b21
b22
− 1− ln b
2
1
b22
)
. (25)
Appendix F: The SMiLe rule for beliefs described by Dirichlet distribution
Assume that the current belief about the probability of transition from state s ∈ {1, 2, ..., D}
to all D − 1 possible next states sˇ ∈ {1, 2, ..., D}\s is described by a Dirichlet distribution
pi0(θs) ∝ Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)α(s,sˇ)−1 parametrized by αs = α(s, :). Here, θs = θ(s, :) denotes a vector
of random variable θ(s, sˇ) that determines the probability of transition from s to sˇ, i.e., 0 ≤
θ(s, sˇ) ≤ 1 and ∑sˇ θ(s, sˇ) = 1. The likelihood function for an occurred transition X : s → s′
is p(X|θs) = θ(s, s′) = Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)[sˇ=s′], where [.] denotes the Iverson bracket. Therefore, the
posterior belief qγ(θs) obtained by the SMiLe rule (7),
qγ(θs) ∝
(
Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)
[sˇ=s′]
)γ
.
(
Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)
α(s,sˇ)−1)1−γ ∝ Πsˇ θ(s, sˇ)β(s,sˇ)−1, (26)
is again a Dirichlet distribution parametrized by β(s, sˇ) = (1− γ)α(s, sˇ) + γ(1 + [sˇ = s′]).
The probability Tˆ [t](s, s′) of transition from s to s′ at time step t is estimated by Tˆ [t](s, s′) =
α[t](s,s′)−1+∑
sˇ(α[t](s,sˇ)−1+) , where α[t](s, sˇ) denotes the updated model parameter at time step t. Here,
 > 0 is a very small number which prevents the denominator to be zero.
Appendix G: The online EM algorithm for the maze-exploration task
The online EM algorithm, presented in (36), is an estimation algorithm for unknown parame-
ters of a hidden Markov model (HMM). For the maze-exploration task we adapted the method
presented in (36) such that the transition probability to a new room also depends on the previ-
ously visited room (and not just the current environment). The HMM of the maze-exploration
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task consists of two sets of unknown parameters: (i) a set P = [Pij]2×2 of (unknown) switch
probabilities from environment i to j (where we use 1 for environmentA and 2 for environment
B), and (ii) a set T = [Tjss′ ]2×16×16 of state transition probabilities, where Tjss′ denotes the
probability of transition from state s to state s′ within environment j. The set of all unknown
parameters is denoted by Θ ≡ (P,T).
At each time step t, we estimate the probability qtl = P (Et = l|s0→t) of being in envi-
ronment Et = l ∈ {1, 2}, given all previous state transitions s0→t = {s0, s1, ..., st}. The
probability qtl can be recursively calculated by
qˆtl =
∑
m
qˆt−1m γ
t
ml, (27)
where γtml =
P (s′=st|s=st−1,Et=l)P (Et=l|Et−1=m)
P (s′=st|s0→(t−1)) belongs to a set of auxiliary variables Γ =
[γlh]2×2 that are calculated by the last estimate Θˆt−1 of the model parameters:
γtlh =
Pˆ t−1lh Tˆ
t−1
hst−1st∑
m,n qˆ
t−1
m Pˆ
t−1
mn Tˆ
t−1
nst−1st
. (28)
Then, using these auxiliary variables γlh, a set Φ = [φˆi,j,s,s′,h]2×2×16×16×2 of parameters is
recursively updated:
φˆti,j,s,s′,h =
∑
l
γtlh
[
(1− η)φˆt−1i,j,s,s′,l + ηqˆt−1l ∆lhst−1stijss′
]
, (29)
where ∆lhst−1stijss′ = δ(i− l)δ(j−h)δ(s−st−1)δ(s′−st), δ(.) is the Kronecker delta (i.e., 1 when
its argument is zero and 0 otherwise), and η is the learning rate.
Finally, the model parameters are updated by
Pˆ tij =
∑
s,s′,h φˆ
t
ijss′h∑
j,s,s′,h φˆ
t
ijss′h
; Tˆ tjss′ =
∑
i,h φˆ
t
ijss′h∑
i,s′,h φˆ
t
ijss′h
. (30)
We emphasize that in order for the online EM algorithm to work properly, some technical
considerations must be respected. For instance, in the beginning of learning, only online esti-
mation of Φ must be updated (without updating the model parameters Θ), so that the estimation
error for the first 2000 time steps of our simulation in Fig. 6-A (blue) remains fixed.
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Appendix H: The raw surprise increases with the information content as
well as with the Bayesian surprise.
The Bayesian surprise (21, 29) measures change in belief and is defined as a KL divergence
DKL[pi0||pi1] between the prior belief pi0 and the posterior belief pi0(θ) that is calculated by the
naive Bayes rule
pi1(θ) =
p(X|θ)pi0(θ)∫
Θ
p(X|θ)pi0(θ) dθ . (31)
The raw surprise Sraw(X; pi0) (1) implicitly incorporates Bayesian surprise. This is because
the raw surprise can be written as two terms as following
Sraw(X; pi0)
(1)
= −
∫
Θ
pi0(θ) ln p(X|θ) dθ
(31)
= −
∫
Θ
pi0(θ) ln
[pi1(θ) (∫Θ p(X|θ)pi0(θ) dθ)
pi0(θ)
]
dθ
= DKL[pi0||pi1]− ln
[ ∫
Θ
p(X|θ)pi0(θ) dθ
]
, (32)
where the first termDKL[pi0||pi1] stands for the Bayesian surprise. The second term,− ln
∫
Θ
p(X|θ)pi0(θ)dθ,
is an upper bound of the information content− ln p(X|θ∗) (and thus increases with the informa-
tion content). Therefore, the raw surprise Sraw(X; pi0) (32) combines both the data-driven (in-
formation content) approach of Shannon and the model-driven (Bayesian surprise) approach for
measuring surprise. Note that our proposed confidence-corrected surprise measure Scorr(X; pi0)
(3) inherits the property of the raw surprise Sraw(X; pi0) (32). As such, it also combines the ben-
efits of both data-driven and model-driven approaches for measuring surprise.
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